INTRODUCTION
The issue of light-water reactor (LWR) safety has been the subject of a part-time, year-long study sponsored by the American Physical Society and supported by the National Science Foundation and the former Atomic Energy Commission. The goal of the study was the assessment of some of the technical aspects of the safety of large light water nuclear power reactors typical of present commercial practice in the United States. The [1974] [1975] The safety philosophy of the nuclear industry has emphasized design which can provide tolerance against malfunctions. This approach has laid a good foundation for reactor safety, and it has resulted in reactors designed, constructed, and operated for safety, not only under normal operating conditions but also in a wide range of abnormal circumstances. A great deal of research, development, and quality control has gone into guaranteeing the integrity of the duel elements and cladding, the integrity of the enclosing primary system, the general structural soundness of the entire reactor, and the ability to control the reactor under both normal and abnormal conditions. Although we have not been able to analyze all of the many possible failure sequences for light-water reactors, one which we have studied in detail is the possible failure of the integrity of the primary reactor pressure vessel. We find that reactor vessels are constructed of materials chosen with care and are designed with substantial safety factors. The reactor vessel is subject to careful scrutiny and testing. Based on our study, we believe that catastrophic rupture of the primary pressure vessel is not likely to be an important contributor to accident initiation; however, this is dependent upon maintaining a strong quality assurance program.
Many aspects need to be better understood through experience and research before such calculations are tractable. Although the probabilities of major accidents seem small, their quantification deserves more attention within the reactor safety community than it has received up to now. We did not have the resources to carry out an independent evaluation of this aspect of the recent AEC Reactor Safety Study (Draft WASH-1400), but we recognize that the event-tree and faulttree approach can have merit in highlighting relative strengths and weaknesses of reactor systems, particularly through comparison of different sequences of reactor behavior. However, based on our experience with problems of this nature involving very low probabilities, we do not now have confidence in the presently calculated absolute values of the probabilities of the various branches.
We have reservations about the present almost exclusive emphasis in the licensing process on the "design basis accident" concept in which certain highly stylized accidents are used as yardsticks against which the performance of various systems is evaluated. While we agree that analysis of such accidents is an important check upon the general safety of reactor designs, we are concerned that other types of possible accidents may consequently receive insufficient attention in design, construction, licensing, and operation.
B. Primary engineered safety features
In our study we centered much attention on the "Itngineered safety features." Because these features are not used in normal operation but are specifically intended to prevent an abnormal incident from becoming an accident, there is only limited operating experience with them. In addition, because of the complexity of the phenomena involved, these features are very difficult to simulate on a computer or to test in simulated accident conditions. Therefore, there is a lack of well-quantified understanding of the performance of some of these special systems under some severe accident conditions.
One of the most important of the engineered safety features is the fast-acting SCRAM system for shutting down the chain reaction in the event of an emergency. Certain transients which are anticipated to occur from time to time (pressure, temperature, reactivity) might play an important role in accident initiation. It is very important to shut down the chain reaction during a large transient. While the SCRAM designs, as now prescribed, seem to us to be highly reliable, not enough is known about the effects of transients in the extremely unlikely event that the reactor does not SCRAM. We believe that insufficient attention has been given to the analysis of transients, although it is encouraging that these areas are now being given intensive study. In addition, we are concerned about transient behavior which might occur simultaneously with a massive electrical failure. While there are redundant off-site power sources, the emergency on-site (diesel) power sources are a recognized weak point.
The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is the engineered safety feature that has received the most publicity, attention, and research. The ECCS is intended to provide emergency cooling to prevent the reactor fuel from melting or losing structural integrity in the event there is a loss of primary system fluid.
We have no reason to doubt that the ECCS will function as designed under most circumstances requiring its use. However, no comprehensive, thoroughly quantitative basis now exists for evaluating ECCS performance because of inadequacies in the present data base and calculational codes. In addition, it is not clear that the present approximate calculations; even though based on generally conservative detailed assumptions, will in all cases yield conservative assessments of ECCS performance.
We have examined the AEC reactor safety research program intended to resolve these uncertainties. Expanded experimental tests and advanced calculational code development are now under way, with the goal of accomplishing a sufficient quantitative comparison between calculation and experiment so that the technical community can reach consensus on ECCS effectiveness. That consensus can only be reached through several years of effort, using improved research techniques, and with more open publication and review of the results. We doubt that a complete quantitative evaluation of ECCS effectiveness can be achieved through the present program. We recommend below several possible approaches for improvement.
C. Accident containment and consequences
The last line of defense in preventing or mitigating the release of radioactivity is a further set of engineered safety features designed as a backstop in case of significant failure of the safety features discussed above. The greater part of this last safety umbrella is the containment machinery and building which enclose the entire reactor primary system. These containments, which have worked well in controlling routine and minor radioactive emissions, have not yet been subjected to test by a large-scale controlled or accidental release. More research toward increasing the effectiveness of containment devices would be prudent, along with more vigorous pursuit of the possibilities for major improvements in containment design.
Although a major release of radioactivity is unlikely, it is important to calculate the types and extent of consequences of releases under various circumstances. We have found that these calculations are very difficult. There are significant uncertainties in nearly every category of potential consequences: immediate deaths, latent cancers, and property damage/deniaL We have made no independent studies of acute effects, the estimates of which are particularly dependent upon details of local siting, weather, and population, and upon important uncertainties in acute biological effects of radiation. However, for the same releases and the same basic references for the biological effects as taken in Draft WASH-1400, we estimate substantially larger long-term consequences, particularly concerning land damage/denial and possible latent cancers from exposures to individuals who live in areas which are contaminated below the evacuation thresholds used in Draft 2 WASH-1400. The social significance of the long-term consequences depends in part upon the probability of the assumed release, regarding which we have made no independent assessment. However, the uncertainities in estimates of consequences need to be resolved because they have important implications in reactor design, siting policy, and protection against potential sabotage. In analyzing the societal risk-benefit balance of commercial nuclear reactors, one must be able to estimate with reasonable confidence both the probability and consequences of system failure; research must continue on both.
Considering the great social importance of reactor safety and the large present and future capital investment in light-water reactors, the current funding of safety research is relatively small. We believe that the many technological opportunities for the enhancement of reactor safety warrant the investment of additional funds in safety research.
D. Major recommendations
Many recommendations are made in the body of this Report. A few of the major ones are summarized here, but in each case the reader is referred to the main text for detailed discussions of the background and rationale. Our major recommendations, which have not been ranked according to their importance, include the following:
(1) Human engineering of reactor controls, which might significantly reduce the chance of operator errors, should be improved. We also encourage the automation of more control functions and increased operator training with simulators, especially in accident-simulation mode.
(2) Measures should be taken to quantify the effectiveness of the present quality assurance program, using both the analysis of experience already reported and new measurements on the quality assurance system. 
